T.C. ULAŞTIRMA,DENİZCİLİK ve HABERLEŞME BAKANLIĞI

Konu : Ticaret Gemilerinin Bilgilendirilmesi.

İlgi : Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanhğı'mn 12/04/2009 tarih ve 3700-089-09 sayılı yazısı.

     İlgi yazıda, Aden Körfezi ve Somali doğusundaki deniz haydutluğu faaliyetleri ile ilgili olarak ABD tarafından yayımlanan Denizcilere Tavsiyeler'den(MARAD 2009-4) bahisle, Ağustos/2008 ayından buyana Aden Körfezi ve Somali doğusundaki deniz haydutluğu faaliyetlerinde artış yaşandığı, 2009 yılında da Somali doğusundaki saldın sayısında artış gözlemlendiği, Somali doğusundaki saldırıların bir kısmının sahilden 500 deniz mili açıkta gerçekleştiği, bu sebeple Somali ile Seyşeller (Seychelles) arasında seyreden gemilerin de deniz haydutlarının saldırılarına uğrama ihtimallerinin mevcut bulunduğu belirtilmektedir.  

     Günün her saatinde saldın eyleminin yaşandığı, bununla birlikte saldırıların büyük çoğunluğunun sabah ve akşam alacakaranlık saatlerinde gerçekleştiği, deniz haydutlarının saldırdığı ve ele geçirdiği ticaret gemilerinin ortak özelliklerinin,  

     • Düşük sürat,  

     • Düşük fribord,  

     • Deniz haydutlarına karşı alınan tedbirlerin görünür olmaması,  

     • Deniz haydutlarına karşı yavaş reaksiyon gösterilmesi,  

     • Geçişleri ile ilgili bilgileri İngiltere'nin Deniz Ticaret Organizasyonu'na(United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization-UKMTO) bildirmemeleri ve wwvv.mschoa.org internet sayfasından göndermemeleri,  

     • Aden Körfezi'nde tesis edilen koridor dışında seyretmeleri olduğu belirtilmektedir.  

     Yazıda devamla, devam eden askeri harekâtın ve ticaret gemilerince alman tedbirlerin etkinliğinde artış sağlanmasına rağmen, deniz haydutlarının geliştirdiği yeni taktik ve teknikler ve kullandıkları coğrafi alanın genişliği nedenleriyle saldın ve kaçırma olaylarında azalma sağlanmadığı belirtilmekte olup, deniz haydutlarının, Somali doğusundaki açık denizde sahilden 500 deniz mili açığa kadar) ana gemi olarak adlandırılan büyük tekneleri kullanarak süratli tekneleri yedeklemekte oldukları, hedeflerini seçtikten sonra süratli teknelerle saldırdıkları, bu nedenle Somali doğusunda seyreden gemilerin 60° doğu boylamının doğusunda, Somali'nin asgari 600 deniz mili açığında seyretmelerinin tavsiye edildiği ifade edilmektedir.  

     Yolcu gemileri ile yat, tekne, yelkenli ve tehlikeli yük taşıyan gemilerin Aden Körfezi ve Somali doğusundan geçmeden önce, deniz haydutlarının hâlihazırdaki imkan ve kabiliyetlerini göz önünde bulundurularak risk değerlendirmesi yapmalarının ve bu doğrultuda geçişe karar vermelerinin gerektiği belirtilmektedir.  

     Aden Körfezi ve Somali doğusunda seyredecek gemilerin bölgeye varışlarından asgari 96 saat önce geçişleri ile ilgili bilgileri UKMTO'ya(Tel: +971-50-552-3215 veya +971-50-552-6007) bildirmelerinin ve www.mschoa.org internet sayfasından göndermelerinin, ayrıca, geçişleri süresince UKMTO(Tel: +971-50-552-3215) ve ABD Deniz İrtibat Ofisi(Maritime Liaison Office-MARLO Tel: +973-3940-1395) ile irtibatta kalmalarının istendiği belirtilmektedir.  

     Bu kapsamda, ABD tarafından yayımlanan Denizcilere Tavsiyeler(MARAD 2009-4), bölgedeki saldırıları gösterir harita, http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=l147 ve http://www.icc-ccs.org/images/stories/pdfs/bmp.pdf internet adreslerinden alınan bilgi notu ve tavsiyeler Ek'te gönderilmekte olup, belirtilen hususlar hakkında gemi sahipleri, işleticileri ve acentelerinin bilgilendirilmesi hususunda bilgilerinizi ve gereğini arz/rica ederim.  

     EKLER:  

     1- Denizcilere Tavsiyeler(MARAD 2009-4)(4 sf)  

     2- Bölgedeki Saldırıları Gösterir Harita(l sf)  

     3- IMO'nun İnternet Adresinden Alınan Bilgi Notu(3 sf)  

       

     2009 - 4 INDIAN OCEAN. GULF OF ADEN. PIRACY COUNTERMEASURES.  

     1. THIS MARAD ADVISORY UPDATES AND SUPERSEDES MARAD ADVISORY 2009-1 WHICH IS HEREBY CANCELLED.  

     2. SINCE AUG 08 THE NUMBER OF PIRATE ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPS THROUGHOUT THE GULF OF ADEN (GOA) AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, PARTICULARLY SOMALIA HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE MAJORITY OF THE PIRATE ATTACKS ARE CLUSTERED ALONG THE SHIPPING LANES IN THE GOA BUT MORE RECENTLY IN 2009, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS WELL TO THE EAST OF THE HORN OF AFRICA INCLUDING ATTACKS 500 MILES OR MORE OFF THE COAST. IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY VESSEL TRAVELING BETWEEN THE SEYCHELLES AND THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA IS SUBJECT TO AS MUCH OF A THREAT AS A VESSEL TRAVELING THROUGH THE GOA AND SHOULD TAKE AS MUCH CARE IN PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR POTENTIAL ATTACKS. VIGILANCE SHOULD BE HIGHEST AT FIRST LIGHT AND LAST LIGHT AS THE MAJORITY OF ATTACKS OCCUR DURING THESE PERIODS. ATTACKS HOWEVER, HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT ALL TIMES OF THE DAY AND MORE RECENTLY DURING NIGHT HOURS, PARTICULARLY WITH MOONLIGHT; THEREFORE VIGILANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES. ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS CONTINUES TO INDICATE THAT THE FOLLOWING COMMON VULNERABILITIES ARE EXPLOITED BY THE PIRATES: LOW SPEED, LOW FREEBOARD, INADEQUATE PLANNING AND PROCEDURES, VISIBLY LOW STATE OF ALERT AND/OR EVIDENT SELF PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND WHERE A SLOW RESPONSE BY THE SHIP IS EVIDENT.  

     3. ON 22 AUG 08, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (CMF) DIRECTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MARITIME SECURITY PATROL AREA (MSPA) IN THE GOA. THE MSPA WAS ESTABLISHED IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION'S (IMO) ONGOING EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF SHIPS AND MARINERS AT SEA. THE MSPA IS A NAVAL MILITARY TERM FOR USE BY WARSHIPS WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER AND IS A GEOGRAPHIC REGION IN THE GOA UTILIZED BY CMF AND POSITIONED TO MAXIMIZE DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE FORCES IN AREAS OF HIGH RISK. COALITION FORCES PATROL THE MSPA ON A ROUTINE BASIS. THE MSPA IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL NAVIGATIONAL MEANS.  

     4. ON 01 FEB 09, CMF IN COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE (EUNAVFOR) ATALANTA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM MARITIME TRADE ORGANIZATION (UKMTO) ACTIVATED THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR (IRTC) THROUGH THE GOA. THIS REVISED CORRIDOR WAS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF COLLISION BETWEEN VESSELS UTILIZING THE PREVIOUS CORRIDOR, PROVIDE A MEASURE OF TRAFFIC SEPARATION, AND ALLOW MARITIME FORCES TO CONDUCT DETERRENT OPERATIONS IN THE GOA WITH A GREATER DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY.   

     5. THE IRTC INCLUDES SEPARATE EAST BOUND AND WEST BOUND TRANSIT LANES. EACH LANE IS FIVE MILES WIDE, SEPARATED BY A TWO MILE BUFFER ZONE. THE EAST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 045 EAST BETWEEN 11-48N AND 11-53N. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A STRAIGHT LINE COURSE OF 072 DEGREES AND TERMINATES AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14-18N AND 14-23N. THE WEST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14-25N AND 14-30N. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A COURSE OF 252 AND TERMINATES AT 045 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 11-55N AND 12-00N. THE IRTC IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL NAVIGATIONAL MEANS, NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE A DEDICATED TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME BUT IN ORDER FOR WARSHIP PATROLS TO BE EFFECTIVE,VESSELS TRANSITING THE GOA ARE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO ADHERE TO THESE GUIDELINES REGARDING USE OF THE IRTC.  

     6. THE MSPA SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE GOA IRTC. THE IRTC IS THE RECOMMENDED PATH THROUGH THE GOA TO ALLOW MINIMAL RESPONSE TIME TO ATTACKS. MSPA PATROLS ARE INTENDED TO MONITOR ACTIVITY BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE IRTC.  

     7. CMF, IN COOPERATION WITH FORCES FROM NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU), CHINA, INDIA, MALAYSIA, RUSSIA, JAPAN, KOREA AND INDONESIA CONTINUE TO PATROL IN THE MSPA AND HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN DETERRING ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING. A FAR GREATER NUMBER OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED THROUGH DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY COMMERCIAL AND CIVILIAN SHIPS PRIOR TO ENTERING AND DURING TRANSIT THROUGH THE AREA. DESPITE THE INCREASE IN PRESENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES, PIRATE ACTIVITY HAS CONTINUED AND A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL AND CIVILIAN SHIPS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED AND SEIZED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PIRATES IN THE AREA CONTINUE TO ADAPT THEIR TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN CAPTURING VESSELS, BOTH IN THE GOA AS WELL AS IN THE OPEN OCEAN OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IN THE INCREASED DISTANCES THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY OFF THE EAST COAST OF SOMALIA POTENTIALLY UTILIZING MOTHER SHIPS. NAVAL VESSELS PATROLLING THE MSPA PROVIDE A MEASURE OF DETERRENCE THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE, BUT THIS IS LIMITED DUE TO THE VAST AREA OF THE GOA AND EVEN LESS EFFECTIVE IN THE OPEN WATERS EAST OF SOMALIA. GIVEN THE HIGH VOLUME OF SHIPPING IN THE REGION, THE SAFETY OF ALL SHIPS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED DUE TO THE OFTEN LONG RESPONSE TIMES DUE TO THE CONSIDERABLE DISTANCES INVOLVED. MASTERS ARE THEREFORE RECOMMENDED TO CONTINUE TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO MAKE THEIR VESSELS LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK WHEN OPERATING IN THE GOA AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA.  

     8. IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT INCREASED THREAT TO VESSELS TRANSITING OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, ADVICE TO MASTERS IS THAT UNLESS THEY SPECIFICALLY HAVE BUSINESS TO CONDUCT ON THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA THEY ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO REMAIN EAST OF 60E AND AT LEAST 600 MILES OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA BUT EVEN AT THAT RANGE THEY SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID, DETER AND DELAY POTENTIAL PIRATE ATTACKS.  

     9. DUE TO THE PIRATES' INCREASED RESOLVE AND ADAPTABILITY, ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS ARE ENCOURAGED. VESSELS SUCH AS PASSENGER LINERS, LUXURY YACHTS, PLEASURE CRAFT, SAILBOATS AND SHIPS CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGO OR OTHERWISE DEEMED TO BE HIGH VALUE ASSETS SHOULD CONDUCT A FULL RISK ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO PLANNING TRANSITS THROUGH HIGH-RISK AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE SPEED AND MANEUVERABILITY LIMITATIONS AND LOW FREEBOARD MAKE A SHIP PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. IN CONDUCTING SUCH AN ASSESSMENT, OWNERS AND MASTERS OF SUCH VESSELS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK AND BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE DEFENSE. ALL PASSENGERS AND CREW SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSITING THESE AREAS AND BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO PROTECT THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK. MASTERS SHOULD REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE UKMTO AND THE UNITED STATES MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. MASTERS ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE DETAILS OF THEIR TRANSIT, AS WELL AS THE TYPE, NATURE AND NUMBER/QUANTITY OF PASSENGERS AND CARGO AT LEAST 96 HOURS PRIOR TO ENTERING HIGH RISK AREAS. THE EU, IN COOPERATION WITH LLOYDS REGISTRY, HAS ESTABLISHED A WEB-BASED RESOURCE FOR SHIPS TO RECEIVE THE LATEST ALERTS, AND REGISTER THEIR VESSELS PRIOR TO TRANSITING HIGH RISK AREAS IN THE REGION. OWNERS AND OPERATORS ARE ENCOURAGED TO REGISTER WITH THE MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE - HORN OF AFRICA (MSC-HOA), AT WWW.MSCHOA.ORG.  

     10. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR ALL VESSELS:  

     A. DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND YOURSELF. DO NOT PRESENT AN ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR ATTACK AND DO NOT SURRENDER IMMEDIATELY AT THE FIRST SIGN OF A THREAT.  

     B. EMPLOY SPEED AND MANEUVER TO AVOID ATTACK. CONDUCT TRANSIT OF HIGH THREAT AREAS AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE SPEED AT ALL TIMES. MAINTAIN A FULL VISUAL AND RADAR WATCH THROUGHOUT TRANSIT. PROVIDE EXTRA LOOKOUTS IF POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. LOOKOUTS SHOULD BE POSITIONED TO ENSURE A 360 DEGREE UNOBSTRUCTED FIELD OF VIEW WITH FULL VIEW OF ALL FREEBOARD AREAS. AVOID TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS WHENEVER POSSIBLE. DUE TO THE SHEER NUMBER OF SMALL BOATS IN THE REGION, MOST OF WHICH ARE FISHING BOATS IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM PIRATE VESSELS. TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE AT TIMES. ACTIVELY WATCH FOR DEVELOPING RULES OF THE ROAD SITUATIONS AND TAKE EARLY ACTION TO INCREASE CPAS. AFT LOOKOUTS MUST BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT FOR SMALL BOATS APPROACHING FROM ASTERN. MANEUVER AGGRESSIVELY IF UNDER ATTACK. MANEUVER TO REMOVE ANY LEE FROM EITHER SIDE OF SHIP (SEA STATE DEPENDENT). IF ENGINEERING OR OTHER TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CAUSE REDUCED SPEED, IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY.   

     C. ADOPT PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES. TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS DETAILED FOR SPEED AND MANEUVER. TAKE DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO ENTERING HIGH THREAT AREAS, INCLUDING RIGGING FIRE HOSES, AND RAISING OUTBOARD EQUIPMENT AND/OR POSITIONING INBOARD. CONSIDER OTHER NONLETHAL MEASURES SUCH AS FOCUSED SONIC DEVICES AND FLARES. CONDUCT TRANSITS IN GROUPS WITH OTHER VESSELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROVIDED BY MSC-HOA.   

     D. ACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SECURITY TEAMS. PROPERLY TRAINED SECURITY TEAMS, WITH EXPERIENCE IN MARITIME DEFENSIVE PROCEDURES, ARE KNOWN TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURE. IF EMPLOYING SECURITY TEAMS, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POTENTIAL FOR THE RISK TO HUMAN LIFE DURING ANY PIRACY ATTACK. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND QUALIFICATION OF ANY PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE BE VERIFIED. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FLAG STATE, SHIPS OWNERS, MASTER AND THE SECURITY TEAM SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND CONTRACTUALLY AGREED UPON.  

     E. IF A SHIP COMES UNDER ATTACK, REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO UKMTO, BROADCAST ATTACKS IMMEDIATELY ON ALL AVAILABLE RADIO CIRCUITS, ADJUST SPEED AND MANEUVER, AND ACTIVATE ALL AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES. DO NOT IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER UPON APPROACH OF SUSPECTED PIRATE BOATS. ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED IN MANY CASES WHERE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WERE USED AND THE VESSELS BECAME DIFFICULT TARGETS. AN ATTACK HAS EVEN BEEN SUCCESSFULLY THWARTED WHERE PIRATES WERE ABLE TO BOARD A SHIP BUT WERE UNABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SUPERSTRUCTURE DUE TO THE CAREFUL PREPARATIONS OF THE CREW IN SECURING ALL ACCESS POINTS.  

     F. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING PRACTICES RECOMMENDED FOR MARINERS OPERATING IN VICINITY OF HIGH RISK AREAS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) REVISED MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE (MSC) CIRCULARS. THESE DOCUMENTS CAN BE ACCESSED VIA IMO WEBSITE AT THE FOLLOWING INTERNET ADDRESS: HTTP://WWW.IMO.ORG/SAFETY/MAINFRAME.ASP?TOPIC_ID=1147. ALSO IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER PIRACY IN THE GOA AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF SOMALIA, INDUSTRY BODIES INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU HAVE PUBLISHED "BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GOA AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA" (FEB 09). THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE ACCESSED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE WEBSITE AT THE FOLLOWING INTERNET ADDRESS: HTTP://WWW.ICC-CCS.ORG/IMAGES/STORIES/PDFS/BMP.PDF.  

     11. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) BAHRAIN, PHONE: 973 1785 3929 OR E-MAIL: MARLO.BAHRAIN@ME.NAVY.MIL OR THE UK MARITIME TRADE ORGANIZATION (UKMTO), PHONE: 97 150 552 3215 OR E-MAIL: UKMTO@EIM.AE OR MSC-HOA, PHONE: 440 192 395 8545 OR E-MAIL: POSTMASTER@MSCHOA.ORG.   

     12. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ADVISORY, CONTACT MR. DOHERTY, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE: MAR-420, ROOM W23-312, 1200 NEW JERSEY AVE, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20590, PHONE: 202 366 1883, FAX: 202 366 3954, TLX II: 710 822 9426 (MARAD DOT WSH) OR E-MAIL-OWEN.DOHERTY@DOT.GOV.  

     Deniz Haydutlarının 2009 Yılındaki Saldırıları

     Piracy and armed robbery against ships  

     Introduction  

     Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships are of tremendous concern to IMO and to shipping in general. The fight to prevent and suppress these acts is linked to the measures to improve security on ships and in port faciltiİes. adopted in December 2002.  

     The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):  

     "Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  

     (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:  

     (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;  

     (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;  

     (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts   

     making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  

     c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)."  

     to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea  

     IMO is implementing an anti-piracy project, a long-term project which began in 1998. Phase one consisted of a number of regional seminars and workshops attended by Government representatives from countries in piracy-infested areas of the world; while phase two consisted of a number of evaluation and assessment missions to different regions. IMO's aim has been to foster the development of regional agreements on implementation of counter piracy measures.  

     The Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), which was concluded in November 2004 by 16 countries in Asia, and includes the RECAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for facilitating the sharing of piracy-related information, is a good example of successful regional co-operation which I MO seeks to replicate elsewhere.  

     More recently, a programme of sub-regional meetings was initiated to promote regional action to address piracy and armed robbery against ships in the wider context of maritime security. The first of these was held in Sana'a, Yemen in April 2005 for States in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden areas, with a follow-up held in Oman in January 2006.  

     The Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection, held in Jakarta, Indonesia in September 2005 also addressed the issues of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Further initiatives under this programme have taken place in the Caribbean, South Asia, Asia Pacific and West and Central Africa in 2006.  

     To assist in anti-piracy measures, IMO issues reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships submitted by Member Governments and international organizations. The reports, which include names and descriptions of ships attacked, position and time of attack, consequences to the crew, ship or cargo and actions taken by the crew and coastal authorities, are now circulated monthly, with quarterly and annual summaries.  

     IMO has issued the following circulars:   

     • Revised MSC/Circ.622 Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships suggests possible counter-measures that could be employed by Rescue Co-ordination Centres and security forces. Now also includes draft Regional agreement on co-operation in preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. (Available in French and Spanish)  

     • Revised MSC/Circ.623 Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships contains comprehensive advice on measures that can be taken onboard to prevent attacks or, when they occur, to minimize the danger to the crew and ship. (Available in French and Spanish)  

     Directives for Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs) on Acts of Violence against Ships (MSC/Circ.1073).  

     Additional guidance on ship security alert systems and other security alerts has been issued as:  

     Guidance on Provision of Ship Security Alert Systems (MSC/Circ.1072);  

     - False security alerts and distress/security double alerts (MSC/Circ.1109/Rev.1): and  

     Guidance on the message priority and the testing of ship security alert systems (MSC/Circ.1155).  

     In November 2001, the IMO Assembly adopted the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.922(22)) as well as Measures to prevent the registration of phantom ships (resolution A.923(22)).  

     Piracy and armed robbery against ships is dealt with by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) as well as by the Facilitation Committee.  

     Further information  

     Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 Information resources on piracy and armed robbery at sea Information resources on maritime security